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Classical probability theory (CPT) has represented the rational standard for decision
making in human cognition. Even though CPT has provided many descriptively excellent
decision models, there have also been some empirical results persistently problematic
for CPT accounts. The tension between the normative prescription of CPT and human
behavior is particularly acute in cases where we have higher expectations for rational
decisions. One such case concerns legal decision making from legal experts, such as
attorneys and prosecutors and, more so, judges. In the present research we explore
one of the most influential CPT decision fallacies, the conjunction fallacy (CF), in a
legal decision making task, involving assessing evidence that the same suspect had
committed two separate crimes. The information for the two crimes was presented
consecutively. Each participant was asked to provide individual ratings for the two crimes
in some cases and conjunctive probability rating for both crimes in other cases, after all
information had been presented. Overall, 360 probability ratings for guilt were collected
from 120 participants, comprised of 40 judges, 40 attorneys and prosecutors, and 40
individuals without legal education. Our results provide evidence for a double conjunction
fallacy (in this case, a higher probability of committing both crimes than the probability of
committing either crime individually), in the group of individuals without legal education.
These results are discussed in terms of their applied implications and in relation to a
recent framework for understanding such results, quantum probability theory (QPT).
Keywords: conjunction fallacy, legal decision making, quantum cognition, quantum probability theory, legal
psychology
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental principle in the judiciary system is that a judgment, decree, or decision rendered by
a court and the interpretation, application, or enforcement of an existing law relating to a particular
set of facts in some case are all products of rational, correct decision making. Such expectations
for a rational standard in decision making increase with seniority in the judiciary system. For
example, in the course of even a single case, a judge may have to make countless decisions, and
every one of them is important for the overall proceedings and legal outcome. A judge decides if
an accused stays out of jail pending trial, whether or not evidence is admissible, and what sources
of information can be included in relation to a crime. Judges often decide if someone should be
found guilty and sentenced, or may be placed on probation, and for how long. Judges must evaluate
evidence, in accordance to particular (often very complex) rules, classify evidence, and employ
evidence in order to issue a verdict. Attorneys and prosecutors must likewise have sufficiently high
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familiarity with legal proceedings, even if the corresponding
expectations for normative decisions are not as high as for
judges, but even lay individuals are sometimes expected to be
able to operate at such high standards in legal proceedings (e.g.,
when members of a jury). There is a clear need to appreciate
the psychological strengths and limitations of human minds to
achieve the normative standard expected in relation to legal
decision making (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996). If human
input into the judiciary process can undermine the accuracy
of criminal verdicts, then the process may be ill equipped
to distinguish truth and error and fall short of delivering
the precision that befits the solemn epistemic demands of
the criminal justice system and the certitude it proclaims to
embody (Simon, 2012). Therefore, it is important to study and
understand the cognitive processes involved in the evaluation of
findings and evidence, probability assessment, problem solving,
biases associated with legal decision-making, and how and when
participants in legal proceedings rely on the perceptions of
others (Kapardis, 2003; Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Spellman and
Tenney, 2010).
Most of the previous research on legal decision making
has focused on the influence of external factors, such as: pre-
trial publicity, inadmissible evidence, scientific evidence, racial
stereotypes, the confidence of eyewitnesses, or indeed their
attractiveness and any informant’s confidence in the quality
of their knowledge (Spellman and Tenney, 2010; Fox et al.,
2011; McCabe and Krauss, 2011; Tenney et al., 2011). Studies
have shown that attorneys and prosecutors often have difficulty
in judging whether a witness correctly identified the alleged
perpetrator, memories are accurate, and a confession offers a
truthful account of the suspect’s deeds (Simon, 2012). Research
in simulated and real legal settings has shown that an adequate
model of judiciary decision making must include the role
of human bias (Green and Wrightsman, 2003), for example,
judges tend to explain a defendant’s actions reflecting on their
own past experiences and assumptions (Saks and Thompson,
2003). Likewise, there is evidence that attorneys and prosecutors
underutilize probabilistic information and fail to understand a
wide variety of statistical principles as well as methodological
issues (McAuliff et al., 2003; Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010; Spellman
and Tenney, 2010). Because of the influence of personal biases,
attorneys and prosecutors given identical information may reach
widely differing verdicts (Green and Wrightsman, 2003). For
example, it has been found that final pieces of evidence have
pervasive impact, the party going with argument as second is
strongly advantaged and evidence occurring toward the end of
the presentation is favored (Walker et al., 1972). In a series
of studies Furnham (1986) has replicated recency effect in the
formation of judgments of innocence and guilt of a defendant
in an actual trial. Identical information received in a different
order produced significantly different final verdicts and the effect
generalized over population and time, that is different subjects
yielded substantially different results. Such results are overall
consistent with research across many more specific areas in
decision making, showing that decisions are subject to framing
or order effects and other apparently incidental aspects of the
presented information and the evaluation process (e.g., Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974; Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992).
Naturally, before a pattern of human decision making can
be relegated to a non-normative bias, one needs a standard
for normative decision making. Psychologists generally endorse
classical probability theory (CPT; e.g., Kolmogorov, 1933) as
the absolute standard for normative behavior (Oaksford and
Chater, 2009; Tenenbaum et al., 2011), over and above notably
classical logic (for the very interesting debate of what is the more
appropriate foundation for rationality in human behavior see
e.g., Oaksford and Chater, 2009, as well as Baratgin et al., 2014;
Cruz et al., 2015; Politzer and Baratgin, 2016). The CPT axioms
are a simple set of principles (e.g., see Howson and Urbach,
1993). These principles are identical whether probabilities are
interpreted as frequencies or subjective degrees of belief. If
one interprets probabilities as frequencies, then one effectively
obtains a picture of probabilities using parts of generalized
volumes, and one is led to the axioms of classical probability
theory. If subjective degrees of belief are employed, these same
axioms are derived with the aid of the Dutch book theorem
(de Finetti et al., 1993). That is, the identical framework of
CPT can be derived either from frequentist probabilities (via set
theory) or subjective probabilities (with the aid of the Dutch
book theorem). Psychologically, the normative case of CPT is
supported by powerful mathematical results, notably the Dutch
book theorem, according to which probabilistic assignment
consistent with CPT protects from certain loss (de Finetti, 1993;
Pothos et al., 2017). CPT is relevant in any situation where a
person needs to adjust subjective probabilities, in light of existing
and new evidence. Indeed, there have been several successful
cognitive models based on CPT, providing good evidence that
humans are mostly rational (overview in Oaksford and Chater,
2009). Equally, there have been persistent discrepancies between
the prescription of CPT and human behavior and such results
cast doubt for any strong claim regarding human rationality
in decision making. Such results are often called fallacies, to
emphasize that corresponding decision making is incorrect.
One of the most famous fallacies is the conjunction fallacy
(CF), discovered by Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) in one of
the most influential studies in decision making. Tversky and
Kahneman presented brief vignettes to participants describing
various hypothetical persons. In one of their examples, Linda was
presented as intelligent and outspoken. Subsequent to reading the
vignette, participants were asked to rank order several statements
about Linda, in terms of how likely they considered them to
be. The critical statements were that Linda is a feminist (F;
very likely given the description), Linda is a bank teller (BT;
very unlikely given the description), and Linda is a bank teller
and feminist. Tversky and Kahneman reported results which
indicated that Prob (F) > Prob (BT&F) > Prob(BT). The finding
that Prob (BT&F) > Prob(BT) has been called the CF, as it is not
possible in CPT. Before we consider how this comes about, note
first that the CF has been extensively replicated—in both Tversky
and Kahneman’s original study and in subsequent work, there
have been numerous replications: the CF is certainly not common
in decision making, but at the same time it is easy to construct
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conditions that reliably lead to a CF (for a recent overview see
Busemeyer et al., 2011).
There have been several attempts to reconcile the CF with
CPT principles and rational behavior. An influential idea is
to explain away the CF as a misunderstanding between what
the experimenter intends and what the participant understands.
Perhaps, in seeing the BT statement, participants understand
BT&∼F (which could be justified as a conversational implicature,
Grice, 1975), another conjunction, and so one that can compare
more flexibly with BT&F. There has been enormous research
on this issue. The bottom line is that, even though various
disambiguation procedures can reduce the rate of the CF, a
residual CF is persistent (e.g., Dulany and Hilton, 1991; Sides
et al., 2002; Moro, 2009; Tentori and Crupi, 2012). Different
notions of probability may also impact on the extent to which
a judgment should be considered a fallacy (Baratgin and Politzer,
2006).
Why is the CF so problematic for the assessment of rationality
in human decision making? Consider the following problem. We
are trying to estimate how often it rains and snows in December
in Krakow. To do this, we consider all days on which it may
have rained and/or snowed in Krakow in each December across
the last 10 years. We count all the days on which it may have
rained. From these rainy days, we identify the subset on which
it snowed too. However, clearly it is not possible to have more
days on which it both rained and snowed, than just rained.
As noted, CPT implies a picture of probabilistic assignment as
generalized volumes, with subsets/ events corresponding to parts
of volumes—a conjunction is an intersection of conjuncts and it
can never be greater than either conjunct.
There have been many attempts to absolve the CF of fallacy,
even excluding any issues related to how the relevant statements
are understood by participants. A trivial one is that when
participants evaluate the conjunction they are in one frame of
mind or context than when the evaluate the conjunct. Then,
the CF result can be written by Prob (BT &F|context1) >
Prob(BT|context2), and the conditionalizing variable no longer
implies a fallacy. However, most decision researchers are not
content with such explanations (we defer a more complete
discussion of possible accounts of the CF until we have actually
demonstrated a CF). Instead, a popular approach is to assume
that there are two separate routes to decision making, one which
is fully normative and produces decisions consistent with the
principles of CPT and one which is quick and approximate,
for quick relatively unimportant decisions, which is the norm
in every day decision making (Sloman, 1996; Kahneman, 2001;
DeNeys and Goel, 2011; Elqayam and Evans, 2013). Given the
importance of decision making in legal contexts for our lives,
such an approach would have to predict that, if humans are
capable of normative decision making at all, this would be
evidenced in such contexts—but, it also appears that decision
fallacies can sometimes appear in such contexts (see also Saks and
Thompson, 2003).
With the above considerations in mind, we consider whether
the CF can be evidenced in decision making relating to legal
problems, using participants across a wide range of legal
expertise, from (legally) naïve individuals, to attorneys and
prosecutors, to judges (in Poland); the latter category represents
an expectation of the highest possible standard of legal decision
making and, if there is reality to dual-route models of human
decision making, they should embody the normative route more
so than other groups. The experimental investigation is based on
the presentation of information regarding two possible crimes
different individuals may have committed. The information for
each crime is presented sequentially. For a particular case, some
participants had to decide whether suspects committed each
crime individually, other participants had to make a single
conjunctive judgment of whether the suspect was guilty of both
crimes. All participants were presented with multiple cases, so
that they had to provide probability ratings both for conjunctions
and individual conjuncts. Classically, if one considers all these
suspects, say they are 100, some of them would have committed
only the first crime and some of them the second crime. For
a suspect to have committed both crimes, clearly he/she needs
to have also committed either crime—it is not possible for
the probability of the conjunction (committing both crimes) to
be greater than for either conjunct (committing either crime
individually). However, psychologically, the logic of the design
is that if a person is, for example judged to be guilty of one
crime, then he/she would be likely to have committed the other
too, especially in cases of related crimes (which is indeed close to
one of Tversky and Kahneman’s, 1983, assumptions for when to
expect a CF, i.e., when there is some causal relation between the
conjuncts).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The study was approved by the ethical committee of the Institute
of Psychology at the University of Silesia and all participants
provided written consent prior to participation.
We briefly describe the legal system in Poland, since all
participants were recruited in that country. According to the rules
governing Polish criminal proceedings, the judge plays an active
role in the trial when the evidence is examined. All courts are
presided over by judges who are appointed by the President of
the Republic on the recommendation of the National Council
of Judiciary. The judges in Poland are independent and are
accountable only to the law. The minimum age for appointment
is 26 and the compulsory retirement age is 70. Candidates for
judicial appointment must successfully pass a public exam and
be employed for at least 2 years as an assistant judge. Professional
judges must attain a university law degree and complete a 4-
year training period and a 2-year period of court apprenticeship.
Professional judges and lay assessors together deliberate and vote
on the penalty to be imposed.
The public prosecutor is the only person who has the right
to issue an order on the presentation of charges, to decide on
the application of pre-trial detention, or to decide the method of
terminating the proceedings. Defendants are presumed innocent
until proven guilty; the burden of proof is on the prosecution.
The accused have the right to a legal advisor, to argumentation,
to participate in procedural actions, to appeal against procedural
decisions, and to be acquainted with the case files. Accused
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persons have the right to employ a legal adviser (attorney or
solicitor) for their defense, if the accused cannot afford to pay for
one, they may be granted legal aid at public expense.
Court proceedings are usually public and take the form of
an oral hearing that is documented on the record. Sentencing is
decided immediately after the judges and lay assessors deliberate
and vote on the question of guilt, the legal classification of the
act, and other issues (e.g., civil complaints). This all occurs in one
session. There is a separate evidentiary proceeding devoted to the
question of the penalty, and a separate session with deliberation
and voting on the penalty imposed. The judgement is an integral
whole and is pronounced on the question of guilt and penalty at
the same time. After the judgement is passed, it is immediately
recorded in writing. In addition, the presiding judge must always
announce it orally in the courtroom.
The law requires the judge and other members of the panel
to rely on three factors during sentencing: (1) evidence and
its evaluation, (2) the principles of science, and (3) personal
experience. The confession of the accused is considered an
important part of the evidence, but it is not sufficient in itself
to prove guilt. The defendant may not be interrogated under
oath. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon process, there are no separate
presentations of evidence by the prosecutor and the defense
during the trial. Expert opinion is subject to evaluation by the
court according to the rules of evidence of Polish criminal
procedure. For this reason, the court is not bound by the
expert’s conclusion. However, as in most other jurisdictions,
expert opinions, especially given by psychiatrists, are accepted
by the courts. This is particularly true if the offender’s mental
capabilities or potential dangerousness are assessed.
Three groups of participants took part in the experiment: 40
criminal court judges (22 women, 18 men, aged between 29 and
66 years, M = 42.25; SD = 7.66; with professional experience
from 3 to 30 years, M = 13.5; SD = 6.30); 40 prosecutors and
attorneys (20 women, 20 men; aged between 28 and 60 years,
M = 40.45; SD = 8.35; with professional experience raging from
one to 35 years, M = 10.05; SD = 8.18); and 40 participants
without legal background (21 women, 19 men, aged between 21
and 62 yearsM = 32.30; SD= 11.09; their non-legal professional
experience ranged from none to 40 years;M = 9.63; SD= 10.80).
All participants were recruited in Poland and were Polish.
The first author used his professional experience and network
to identify professional participants (judges, prosecutors, and
attorneys) willing to take part. The participants with no legal
background were recruited by the first author as well, amongst
colleagues/ acquaintances. Decision as to whether or not to
take part in this study was completely voluntary. Subjects were
informed, that the aim of the research is to explore legal decision
making and distinctive characteristics of judges and lawyers in
evidence evaluation mechanisms. Participants received a consent
form (for participation to the study) prior to the study and a
debriefing form after the end of the study. Participants received
no compensation or remuneration for taking part in the research.
Note, given the focus of the study on judges and attorneys
in law (including prosecutors), the only option for proceeding
was professional/personal contacts of the first author (who is
a practicing attorney). Notably, we could not offer financial
incentives for participation, because it is extremely complicated
in the Polish system to pay judges or prosecutors (and indeed it is
unlikely that a small payment would motivate such individuals
to take part in a psychology study). Given that one part of
the sample was not monetarily compensated for participation,
it was appropriate to seek volunteers for all participant groups.
One might wonder whether the voluntary nature of participation
could introduce systematic biases in participants’ performance,
but in this case it is unclear what would be the nature of such
biases (this is not a study where higher motivation could easily
translate to a simple measure of “better” or worse performance,
at least not in a way that would be obvious to participants;
Orne, 1962). Still, we cannot preclude the possibility that the
personal connection that was the basis for recruitment might
have influenced results in a certain way.
Design
The experiment had a 2 (is the suspect guilty or innocent?: guilty
vs. innocent) x 2 (rating: a single conjunctive rating for both
crimes vs. two ratings for each crime) x 3 (participant: judge vs.
lawyer vs. layperson) mixed design (Figure 1). The participant
variable was a between participants factor, the suspect and rating
variables were within participant factors. The CF would be
committed if there is a main effect of rating. Note, for a particular
case, a CF would be assessed on the basis of ratings from
different participants, but each participant provided ratings for
both individual crimes and conjunctive ratings for the two crimes
in a case. The two challenges we had to address are these: First,
we wanted participants to make judgments both for conjunctive
and individual events. This is an obvious requirement since
the probabilistic assessment for e.g., a conjunction matters only
by comparison to that of a marginal. Second, it is clearly
meaningless to ask the same participant to rate simultaneously
both the conjunction and the individual statements for the
same case. Equally, we could not adopt Tversky and Kahneman
(1983) ingenious procedure of rank ordering marginals and
conjunctions. Therefore, we resorted to a mixed effects approach,
with specific case tracked explicitly in the analyses (instead of
averaging). Regarding the conceptual assumptions that support
a conclusion of a CF or not, for each case we took care to
provide detailed vignettes with all relevant information so that,
to a first approximation, all participants can be thought of
as having the same knowledge prior to providing probability
estimates.
An interesting possibility concerns an interaction between
rating and participant, with some participant groups less likely to
commit the CF. Dual route approaches to decision making will
lead us to expect that judges would be less likely to commit the
CF, compared to participants with no legal training.
Materials
During previous studies we have gained access to real life criminal
cases records from different District Courts and Appellate
Courts in Poland of criminal investigations concerning crimes
committed between years 2000 and 2015. The files for each
criminal case, including interrogation and interview protocols,
expert evidence, and adjudications, were thoroughly reviewed
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FIGURE 1 | The design of the study and an outline of the procedure.
FIGURE 2 | CF and guilt probability ratings by different professional groups of (A) guilty suspects’ cases and (B) innocent suspects’ cases (on a 1 to 10 points scale),
bars represent standard error of the mean.
and photocopied. Out of these 400 criminal cases, we first
selected 60 cases based on the following criteria. First, we chose
records from different court districts than those of the (legal
profession) participants to eliminate possibility that subjects
will be assessing cases they would have come across in the
past. Second, we aimed for an approximate balance between
cases in which the suspect was guilty and innocent, specifically
cases for which the suspect was innocent of both crimes
and guilty of both. Guilt of the suspect in individual cases
was established on the basis of the ruling court’s justification.
Third, we required that, in cases of true statements from the
suspect, there was overwhelming evidence independent of the
suspect’s statement which corroborated the statement and, in
cases of false statements, that there was overwhelming evidence
independent of the suspect’s statement which refuted it. These
criteria for inclusion are reasonable given that, on the one
hand, complete truths are usually unobtainable in criminal cases
but, on the other hand, making correct classifications of the
transcripts was crucial for the study’s validity. Fourth, as the
study was based on case summaries (it would be impractical
to employ full records), we ensured that the case summaries
correctly revealed the guilt or innocence of the suspect. This
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FIGURE 3 | An illustration of the QP approach for the (single) conjunction fallacy in (A) the classic “Linda problem” and in (B) legal decision making.
was established by having two independent competent raters—
an experienced retired prosecutor and an experienced retired
attorney recruited by the experimenter—examine each summary
and determine whether the summary led to a conclusion
regarding the suspect’s guilt and innocence for one or both
offenses consistent with the trial outcome. Only case summaries
of confirmed valence during this preliminary stage were used
in the main experiment. Finally, factors such as the type of
crime and the suspect’s gender, age, and ethnicity varied across
the transcripts (but could not be fully counterbalanced). The
above criteria allowed us to identify 18 case summaries (from
the original 60 cases), divided as follows: 9 summaries of cases
when suspect was guilty of both charges and 9 summaries
of cases when suspect was innocent of both charges. All the
materials were in Polish and are available from the authors on
request.
Procedure
All participants received three criminal case summaries to assess.
They could freely choose where and when to complete the task.
Participants were instructed to read the descriptions carefully
and to assign a probability that the suspect is guilty on a 10-
point scale, with anchors: 1-definitely innocent, to 10-definitely
guilty. Note, arguably in real life legal decisionmaking judgments
are qualitative, but an examination of putative CFs requires
numerical estimates (but see Politzer and Baratgin, 2016, for a
broadly relevant alternative approach). It took the subjects from
20 to 50min to read descriptions of individual cases and to
assign the probability. For each case, participants either rated
the probability of each crime separately (two single ratings for
each crime) or they provided a single conjunctive rating for
both crimes. Participants randomly received two vs. one cases
in which they had to make two individual judgments vs. one
conjunctive one, or vice versa. So, each participant would have
to make between four and five guilt determinations. Presentation
order was randomized across participants, so that for the same
pair of crimes, some participants were shown the relevant
information in one order and other participants in the converse
order.
RESULTS
Unless stated otherwise, the dependent variable was the rating
that a suspect was guilty of a particular crime, denoted as
Prob(guilt). We collected 360 ratings from participants, equally
divided between the three groups of participants (judges,
lawyers, individuals without a legal background). Of these
ratings, 170 pairs of crimes were rated individually and 190
pairs of crimes were rated with a single conjunctive rating.
Subjects assigned probability of suspect’s guilty on a 10-point
scale, with anchors: 1-definitely innocent, to 10-definitely guilty.
Below, when we talk about probability of guilt, we imply
a linear mapping from these ratings to assumed, subjective
probabilities.
We ran a mixed effects model (multilevel linear model in
SPSS with both random and fixed effects) with probability
rating as the dependent variable, profession as a fixed effect
between participants independent variable (three levels: judge,
lawyer, participants without legal education), rating type as
a fixed effect within participants independent variable (three
levels, probability for A, probability for B, and probability for
the conjunction A&B), and case type (two levels, innocent vs.
guilty cases) as the last fixed effect independent variable. Two
interaction terms were included, rating x profession and rating x
profession x case type; the restriction to these interaction terms
was theoretically motivated. Note, it may be thought that case
type should actually be used to split the data file, since obviously
ratings for innocent cases would be very different for ratings
for the guilty ones. However, regarding the key hypothesis of
whether a CF occurs or not, for both guilty and innocent cases
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a CF involves probabilities in the same direction, Prob (A&B) >
Prob(A) or Prob (A&B) > Prob(B) (or both). We employed
a single random effect of participant. The random effect was
modeled with both intercept and slopes, but random slopes were
employed only for the case type fixed effect, partly so as to
not overcomplicate the model, partly because theoretically it is
mainly the relationship between case type and the dependent
variable that might plausibly be affected by the participant
random effect. Note, the possibility of introducing a second
random effect of particular test item is problematic because
crossing these two random effects (participant and specific item)
leads to many cells with just one observation.
An unstructured covariance matrix was assumed and model
parameters were estimated with maximum likelihood, so that−2
log likelihood could be employed to evaluate nested models. For
brevity we only consider three models, one without the random
effect, one with the random effect but only intercepts, and the
final one with the random effect and both intercepts and slopes.
Each model elaboration was highly significant so it was the final
model that was employed in the assessment of the hypotheses
of interest [χ2 (1) = 10, p = 0.001; χ2 (5) = 55, p < 0.0005].
For the final model, there was a highly significant main effect
of case type [F(1, 171.5) = 403, p < 0.0005], which is hardly
surprising, since all it indicates is that participants responded
differently to the cases which were really for guilty suspects vs.
ones which were really for innocent suspects. This main effect
is simply a validation of the design. The mean rating for guilty
cases was indeed higher than for innocent ones [MGuilty = 8.935,
SEGuilty = 0.121 vs. MInnocent = 3.995, SEInnocent = 0.204). More
interestingly, there was also a highly significant triple interaction
between rating, profession, and case type [F(8, 207.2) = 2.706,
p= 0.007].
It is by analyzing this triple interaction that we can assess
evidence for a CF, for different professions, and separately for
the guilty vs. innocent cases. In order to do this, we ran simpler
mixed effects models with participant still included as a random
effect, but now the influence of the random effect restricted
to intercepts; there was only a single fixed effect of rating.
The post-hoc procedure for estimated means was uncorrected
t-tests, since in all cases such comparisons would be planned
as tests of a putative CF. For when the case type was guilty,
for judges there was an effect of rating [F(2, 64.3) = 3.503,
p = 0.036], but no evidence for a CF, rather a situation where
Prob (B) > Prob(A&B) (MProbB = 9.543, SEProbB = 0.250;
MProbA&B = 8.831, SEProbA&B = 0.276, marginally approaching
significance, p = 0.058, d = 0.612) (Taylor, 2015). For lawyers
there was no main effect of rating [F(2, 94) = 2.331, p = 0.103].
For participants without a legal background there was an effect
of rating [F(2, 61.9), p = 5.273, p = 0.008] and, importantly, in
this case there was evidence for a double CF with Prob(A&B)
(MProbA&B = 9.354, SEProbA&B = 0.228) being greater than
both Prob(A) (MProbA = 8.563 SEProbA = 0.217) and Prob(B)
(MProbB = 8.563, SEProbB = 0.217; in both cases p = 0.005,
d = 0.636). For when the suspect was really innocent, there was
no effect of rating for judges [F(2, 58.6) =2.081, p = 0.134] or
for lawyers [F(2, 72) = 0.306, p = 0.737], and in this case no
effect for participants without a legal education too [F(2, 58.4) = 1,
p = 0.375]. Figure 2 presents the probability assessments of
judges, lawyers, and participants without legal background.
DISCUSSION
A CF was observed in the case of probabilistic assessment in
legal decision making, but only for participants without a legal
background. Participants rated the probability of guilt for a
suspect accused of two crimes. Participants either rated each
crime separately or provided a single conjunctive judgment for
both crimes. The finding that a CF can be observed in legal
decision making is perhaps less surprising, since there have been
other instances of probabilistic errors in related contexts (Walker
et al., 1972; Furnham, 1986). The important conclusion concerns
the lack of a CF, for participants with a legal background.
The observation of a double CF in the participant group with
no legal background, but not for attorneys in law or judges, raises
a potential question of whether the presence of the double CF
in legal decision making of the type we explored has to do with
lack of a legal background specifically or lack of a professional
background more generally. The evidence suggests it is the
former, since we took care to match the non-legal profession
participants as closely as possible with the participants having
a legal background (e.g., the average professional experience of
the non-legal background participants was 9.84 years). Of course,
one can wonder whether analogous patterns would be observed
in other, specific professional groups, e.g., doctors. However,
such an objective is beyond the scope of this work (and perhaps
of arguable interest given the already extensive evidence for
CF; e.g., see Busemeyer et al., 2011, for a review). Instead, our
question was this: considering a legal decision making situation
where professional participants without a legal background can
demonstrate a (double) CF, is there evidence that participants in
legal professions demonstrate a similar bias? The answer is no
and we argue that this is an interesting conclusion exactly because
of the higher expectations for normative (legal) decision making
for agents in theses professions.
Now that we have observed a CF, we turn the discussion to
formal accounts of the CF. Some of the related formal work has
been directed toward assessing whether a CF indeed represents
a probabilistic error. Recently, there have been a few attempts
to recast the CF as a judgment consistent with probability
theory. We highlight two such attempts and focus on a third.
First, inductive confirmation proponents have argued that in CF
experimental paradigms participants do not mentally compute
a conjunction, when faces with a statement such as BT&F (in
Tversky and Kahneman’s, 1983, Linda paradigm), but rather
with inductive confirmation, the extent to which adding some
information (e.g., the Linda story) corroborates or disconfirms
a hypothesis (Tentori et al., 2013). Inductive confirmation is
certainly a very powerful idea in belief updating, however, there
are some concerns as to whether a CF paradigm can be recast as
an inductive confirmation problem, especially in the case of the
present experiment, where the conjunctive nature of the decision
on both crimes was clear (see also Busemeyer et al., 2015b).
Second, some researchers have advocated a view of normative
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decision making based on CPT, but with noise (Costello and
Watts, 2014). According to this view, probabilistic inference
involves a process of mental sampling/ simulation, which is more
error prone formore complex probabilities, such as conjunctions.
However, there is no directly empirical evidence for such amental
sampling process and indeed the assumption appears particularly
suspect in the case of highly unique and individualized situations,
such as the crime summaries in the present study. Additionally,
there have been some concerns regarding the extent to which the
noise approach can offer a coherent account of both conditional
probabilities and order effects in decision making.
Quantum probability theory (QPT) is a third formal approach
to the CF and, even though it is not without criticism (Busemeyer
and Wang, 2015; Boyer-Kassem et al., 2016), it does have an
advantage of generality and generative value (e.g., Pothos and
Busemeyer, 2013; Wang et al., 2014; White et al., 2014; Bruza
et al., 2015). We explain the QPT account detail since, while it
can provide a simple and intuitive explanation for single CFs,
double CFs require a degree of elaboration. We call QPT the
rules for how to assign probabilities to events from quantum
mechanics, without any of the physics. QPT basically provides
a set of rules for probabilistic inference, alternative to CPT. QPT
cognitive models have been pursued exactly for empirical results
which are problematic from a classical perspective, such as the
CF. They have been employed to accommodate a fairly wide
range of decision fallacies, including order effects in evidence
assessment in legal decision making (Aerts and Aerts, 1995;
Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009; Trueblood and Busemeyer, 2010,
2011; Busemeyer et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2014; White et al.,
2014, 2016; overviews in Busemeyer and Bruza, 2011; Haven
and Khrennikov, 2013; Pothos and Busemeyer, 2013). QPT
inference is strongly dependent on context and perspective,
so that, for example, the nominally same question may have
different meanings depending on whether it is asked in isolation
or together with other questions. Another feature of QPT is
that some questions are compatible and for such questions
probabilistic picture is nearly the same as in the classical case.
However, other questions are incompatible and incompatible
questions are subject to strong contextual/ order effects.
In the case of a single CF, we can illustrate a QPT approach
by analogy to Busemeyer et al.’s (2011) quantum model for the
standard CF. The illustration develops on the basis of a greatly
simplified caricature of the full model, but this is sufficient
for the present purposes. In QPT, the first step is to specify a
vector space such that each subspace in this space corresponds
to the outcomes of different questions. In the simplest case,
these subspaces are one dimensional (rays). The second step is
to determine a (normalized) vector which has the role of the
mental state just prior to answering the questions. Note, in QPT
probabilistic assessment is always (mental) state dependent, while
for CPT the role of the mental state, if at all, has to be taken
into account as conditionalizing information. The third step is to
compute probabilities given the QPT rules: the probability that a
participant in mental state represented by ψ answers with “yes” a
binary question A is given by Prob (A;ψ) = |PA,yesψ |
2, where
PA,yes is the projector operator onto the subspace representing
the yes outcome for question A. A projector operator takes
a vector and lays it down onto a subspace; then, probability
is computed as the squared length of this projection. In the
case of the classic CF, an illustrative caricature of the model
is simply as in Figure 3A, which was constructed by taking
into account the minimal assumptions that the mental state at
the outset has to be closer to the Fyes ray than the BTyes one
and that the BT, F rays are relatively uninformative relative
to each other (a prototypical F is not particularly likely or
unlikely to be a BT and vice versa). Then, Prob (BT;ψ) =
|PBT,yesψ |
2, Prob
(
F& then BT;ψ
)
= |PBT,yesPF,yesψ |
2. Note
first that a conjunction for QPT incompatible questions
can only be computed as a sequential projection, since we
cannot concurrently determine the truth/falsity of incompatible
questions. It can be readily seen that the end result from the
sequential projection PBT,yesPF,yesψ is larger than PBT,yesψ , that
is, Prob
(
F& then BT;ψ
)
> Prob (BT;ψ). Without going into
the details of whether this is a good model for the CF in the
Linda paradigm or not (see Busemeyer et al., 2011, 2015b), one
can readily see that it is possible to obtain the CF as a “correct”
probabilistic outcome. The conceptual interpretation of the QPT
CF model is that from the initial perspective of the Linda story
it is very difficult to see Linda as a BT, but once we accept
Linda as a F, then it becomes easier to imagine her as a BT
too.
The reason for considering the above QPT approach is that
this is the one most commonly employed in considerations
of how QPT can describe the CF (Busemeyer et al., 2015a,b).
However, most existing research in the CF has focused on single
CFs, according to which Prob(A)>Prob(A&B)>Prob(B), that
is a CF occurs only for one of the two conjuncts. If we had
observed single CFs in the present results as well, it would be
straightforward to adapt existing QPT work (e.g., Figure 3B).
Instead, the main result we obtained was one of a double
CF. It is important to explain why the above approach cannot
accommodate a double CF. For a double CF, we have: Prob(A),
Prob(B)>Prob(A&B), that is a CF occurs for both conjuncts. That
the aboveQPT approach cannot accommodate double CFs can be
seen by noting that Prob
(
F& then BT;ψ
)
= |PBT,yesPF,yesψ |
2 =
|PBT,yesψF,yes|
2|PF,yesψ |
2 = Prob (BT|F) Prob(F). Therefore while
we can have Prob
(
F& then BT;ψ
)
> Prob(BT;ψ), it is not
possible to also have Prob
(
F &then BT;ψ
)
> Prob(F;ψ).
The double CF in the present work in the present work is an
important empirical finding partly for the above reasons. It is
worth noting that double CF evidence in the literature generally
has been controversial (e.g., Busemeyer et al., 2015b), though in
the present case a double CF is intuitive. For the participants
with no legal background, we have a situation where Prob(A),
Prob(B)>Prob(A&B), for when evaluating criminal cases for
which the suspect was guilty for both crimes.
Given that the standard version of an influential approach
for the CF, QPT, cannot accommodate a double CF, it is
worth exploring how a QPT account could be extended. A
starting point is that the representation for such cases involves
compatible questions, rather than incompatible ones as above—
this is an important assumption and we will return to it. This
means that the consideration of each crime takes place in a
separate QPT space. If in addition we have a tensor product
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representations along the lines ψ = |c1yesCrime1yes +
c1noCrime1no〉
⊗
|c2yesCrime2yes + c2noCrime2no〉
= c1yesc2yes |Crime1yes〉 |Crime2yes〉 + c1yesc2no
|Crime1yes〉 |Crime2no〉 + c1noc2yes |Crime1no〉 |Crime2yes〉 +
c1noc2no |Crime1no〉 |Crime2no〉 (where | . . .〉 is the Dirac
bracket notation, indicating column vectors; we omit the
tensor product symbol
⊗
after the first expression for
brevity, and c1yes, c1no, c2yes, c2no are complex coefficients),
then the situation is mostly classical. Denote as PCrime1yes
the projector for a “yes” response for the first crime in a
case and analogously for other P . . . objects. For example,
Prob(Crime1yes &Crime2yes;ψ) = |PCrime1yes
⊗
PCrime2yesψ |
2
=
|PCrime1yes
⊗
PCrime2yesc1yesc2yes |Crime1yes〉 |Crime2yes〉|
2
=
|c1yesc2yes|
2 = |c1yes|
2|c2yes|
2 = Prob(Crime1yes)
Prob(Crime2yes), as expected classically. However, not all
states ψ can have a tensor product structure. An extreme
case of so-called entanglement would be a state of the form
ψ = a |Crime1yes〉 |Crime2yes〉 + b |Crime1no〉 |Crime2no〉,
implying a commitment to a situation that a suspect either
definitely committed both crimes or definitely did not commit
either crime. In such a state, deciding on the first crime resolves
any uncertainty about the second crime too. However, this
is not sufficient to produce a CF. If, for example, we write
ψ = a |Crime1yes〉 |Crime2yes〉 + b |Crime1yes〉 |Crime2no〉 +
c |Crime1no〉 |Crime2yes〉 + d |Crime1no〉 |Crime2no〉, then
Prob(Crime1yes;ψ) = |PCrime1yes
⊗
Iψ |2 =
|a|2 + |b|2 and Prob(Crime1yes & Crime2yes;ψ) =
|PCrime1yes
⊗
PCrime2yesψ |
2
= |a|2. Clearly, Prob(Crime1yes;ψ)
> Prob(Crime1yes &Crime2yes;ψ).
The observed results require an initial representation for the
mental space in a tensor product structure as above, but also
a thought process which “mixes” thoughts and beliefs between
the two crimes (Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009; Broekaert et al.,
2017). It is not our purpose presently to outline in detail a
full cognitive model for the consideration of criminal cases
and we focus on the technical elements of QPT that allow
for coverage of the results (for more relevant details see e.g.,
Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009; Trueblood and Busemeyer, 2011;
Pothos et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013; Narens, 2014). The
generic thought process in QPT is typically modeled as a unitary
operation and the specification of the unitary embodies the
psychological assumptions about the thought process (however,
note that analogous constructions in CPT still have to conform
to the conjunction constraint; Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009,
demonstrate this directly). The unitary can have a tensor
product structure UCrime1
⊗
UCrime2, in which case nothing
changes relative to above, Prob
(
Crime1yes&Crime2yes;ψ
)
=
|PCrime1yes
⊗
PCrime2yesUCrime1
⊗
UCrime2ψ |
2
=
|PCrime1yesUCrime1
⊗
PCrime2yesUCrime2ψ |
2; this final expression
will be constrained by the conjunction constraint. Suppose
though that U has a more complex form, for example,
U =


1 0
0 0
0 0
−1 0
0 −1
0 0
0 0
0 1

 6= U1⊗U2 for any individual
U1, U2. The main characteristic of this unitary is that it
“mixes” amplitude from the space corresponding to the
consideration of one crime to the space of the other. It
is convenient to revert to matrix notation here, writing
ψ =


a
b
c
d

, PCrime1yes⊗ I =
(
1 0
0 0
)⊗(1 0
0 1
)
=


1 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0

,
I
⊗
PCrime2yes =
(
1 0
0 1
)⊗(1 0
0 0
)
=


1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0

, and
PCrime1yes
⊗
PCrime2yes =
(
1 0
0 0
)⊗(1 0
0 0
)
=


1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0

.
Given the above specification, we have:
Prob
(
Crime1yes;ψ
)
= |PCrime1yesIUψ |
2
= |


1 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0

 ·


1 0
0 0
0 0
−1 0
0 −1
0 0
0 0
0 1

 ·


a
b
c
d

 |2 = |a− c|2
Prob
(
Crime2yes;ψ
)
= |I
⊗
PCrime2yes · Uψ |
2
= |a− b|2
Prob
(
Crime1yes&Crime2yes;ψ
)
= |a|2 (1)
Recall that a mental state vector in QPT is normalized, therefore
|a|2+|b|2+|c|2+|d|2 = 1. However, since the above equations do
not reference d, we have flexibility to accommodate the observed
probabilities even in a real space, for example, |a|2 = 0.944,
so that a = 0.972, |a− c|2 = 0.877, so that c = 0.036,
|a− b|2 = 0.868, so that b = 0.04 and, from normalization,
we have d = 0.052. Overall, these parameter values can produce
the double CF observed for the participants judging the crimes
when in both cases the suspect was in reality guilty. We stress
that we do not intend this to be considered a QPT model for
double CF proper; for such a model, more careful consideration
should be given to the psychological motivation for the unitary
matrix (corresponding to the thought process) and fitting of the
marginal probabilities. Rather, our intention is to show how in
principle one can extract a double CF from QPT, based on a
modeling approach which has been employed before in decision
making.
Overall, the present results revealed a double CF, for lay
(regarding legal knowledge) individuals, but not for participants
with more advanced levels of legal knowledge / experience with
legal proceedings. As an empirical finding, this constitutes a
salutary message regarding the ability of humans to embody
rational decision making, in situations where there is a high
expectation for such decision making. The double CF presents a
challenge for decision models specifically developed to account
for the CF and related fallacies. We focussed on one model,
based on QPT. So far, QPT theory for the CF has been applied
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to the single CF, which is by far the most common finding.
Modeling of the single CF with QPT involves incompatible
questions, which lead to a psychological explanation based
on how one question alters our perspective for the other.
Regarding the double CF, we have outlined one possibility
based on QPT, corresponding to compatible questions, and a
“mixing” thought process. Psychologically this corresponds to a
consideration of the two questions in a way that thoughts making
each one individually more likely interfere with each other
in the conjunctive case to produce probabilities inconsistent
with CPT.
Generally, whether two questions are more likely to
be represented as incompatible or compatible is currently
approached as an empirical issue: there are simple empirical tests,
such as order effects, which allow us to determine empirically
whether two questions are compatible or incompatible. The
QPT modeling indicates that for (legally) naïve participants
consideration of one crime impacts on the consideration of
the other crime. Perhaps for lay participants naïve familiarity
with situations where a person is either generally guilty or
not guilty at all influences their perception of how guilt
for one crime affects guilt for another. Note, even though
the QPT model is descriptive, it does accommodate results
which are beyond any standard CTP approach. In order to
develop the present intuitions into more inferential models, one
challenge is to link various individual differences aspects of
the participants (such as experience with particular situations)
to key aspects of the modeling, notably compatibility vs.
incompatibility. Notwithstanding these challenges for future
work, the present results provide both additional evidence that
legal decision making should be further scrutinized for potential
fallacies and a theoretical framework with QPT which, however
preliminary, offers some possible insights regarding human
behavior.
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